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A planned policy for economic development is both com­
plicated and comprehensive. It must influence and direct 
the whole activity of a modern society in all its ramifi­
cations.
Jean Tinbergen
I
Planning for an economic policy and more particu­
larly for a development policy is today becoming 
more and more a part of state activity. More coun­
tries are tending to adopt this technique, and the 
technique itself is constantly improving. The com­
munist countries went over quite suddenly after the 
Bolshevik Revolution from an unplanned to a plan­
ned economy; the transition in other countries was 
however gradual. Whereas in the past, the state 
often acting in accordance with the principle of lais­
sez-faire, only after natural catastrophe—a war or 
some other grave crisis or difficulty—the conscious 
introduction of 'thinking ahead’ has gradually led 
to the practice of forming an idea of the situation 
that will most probably prevail at some future pe­
riod of time. This thinking ahead is now known as 
forecasting and has continued to improve in recent 
years. We have progress from the rather naive meth­
od of forecasting by extrapolating the line of a 
graph to the much more sophisticated method of 
forecasting based on the knowledge of the operation 
of social forces.
There has also been a change in the basic method­
ology from a micro to a macro approach as more 
attention has been given to the connection between 
various economic, social and political forces, with 
the result that every effort is now made to inte­
grate isolated parts of economic policy. For example, 
when the west reached the stage of planning and de­
fining its economic aims, there was a marked pref­
erence for the use of what are known as macro-ec­
onomic figures, showing a summary of the nation­
al income, national consumption, employment and 
so on.1
Among the simplifications that have so far been 
scientifically applied with some success can be count­
ed as a series of assumptions which may be termed 
the assumptions of a long-existing development. They 
include, for example, a constant growth of popula­
tion, a constant investment quota (in other words, 
a constant relationship between investment and a 
national product), a constant discount for the de­
ferment of consumption, a constant technical devel-
1. Theil, H., Economic Forecasts and Policy, Amsterdam, 
1968, Zoderdipan, pp. 71-72.
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opment and the existence of a certain kind of sim­
ple law of production, the so-called Cobb-Douglas 
function.1 In general terms the three chief elements 
of modern planned economic policy are: a looking 
ahead, coordination and the attainment of a deli­
berate aim.2 A given aim no doubt can be achieved 
by various means or a combination of means and 
one of the special functions of the plan is that 
of choosing the best possible means from all those 
available. The choice of means is to a great extent 
conditioned by their effectiveness, although the 
question of preference, or valuation will also play 
a part in determining this choice, since a means 
will only be considered suitable if the sacrifices are 
slightly in relation to the results expected.
Above all, in spite of the progress made to date 
in the very methodology and technique of planning 
for development, it is to be noted that developmental 
planning is a comparatively new branch of applied 
science, barely twenty years old in the west, and 
over fifty years old in the Soviet Union. In prin­
ciple it is concerned with the whole economy. It is 
hardly necessary to say that it is still underdevelop­
ed and unable to provide an answer, or at least a 
full answer to many of the questions that arise in 
the course of formulating a developmental plan.3 4
II
The Indian economy at the end of British rule 
(in 1947) had practically reached a stage of stag­
nation. This can be attributed to the passive role 
of the colonial government in the process of econom­
ic development. As a result, per capita income in 
India had not risen in fifty years, and was in 1951 
about one-fortieth of that of the United States, one 
thirteenth of that of the United Kingdom, and a- 
bout one-third of that of Japan. The per capita in­
come is, in fact, lower than that of the other fifty- 
four underdeveloped countries for which the United 
Nations has published the data, including Egypt, 
Brazil, and Peru.1
Very likely also, the standard of living of the large 
masses of people in India was even lower than in­
dicated by the per capita income, because of the une­
qual distribution of income, unemployment, and un­
der-employment. In 1950, out of a total working 
force of about 170 million, about 8 million were
1. Phelps, E., 'The Golden Rule of Accumulation’, the 
American Economic Review, LI (1961), pp. 638.
2. Tinbergen, J., Development Planning, McLord Univer­
sity Library, McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1967, pp. 44 and 76.
3. Ibid, p. 43.
4. United Nations Statistical Papers, Service 4, Per Capita 
National Product of Some Selected Countries, 1952-54. New
York, 1957.
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unemployed and about 15 million on a conservative 
estimate were under-employed.5
If steel output and the educational base, particu­
larly technical education, were to be considered as 
rough indices of the extent of development, Indian 
development with regard to the steel output even in 
1955-56 was some 60 to 80 years behind that of the 
United States, United Kingdom, Germany, France, 
and Russia. On the other hand, from the point 
of education Indian development was behind all these 
countries by about 80 to 100 years.® Such short­
comings were aggravated by the large absolute size 
of her population, about 361 million in 1951, to be 
exact.
In view of this there existed a compelling urgency 
to generate and accelerate a process of sustained 
growth in India. This urgency has become even 
more pressing due to the widespread poverty and 
the growing awareness that something must be done, 
and done at once. Moreover, unlike countries 
where economic evolution preceded political evolu­
tion, India attained political freedom, far ahead of 
economic freedom. Because of this phenomenon, the 
need for economic development became both more 
imperative, and more difficult. It soon became 
apparent that if social, political, and economic ca­
tastrophes, were to be avoided, India needed to ac­
complish in a very short period the degree and ex­
tent of economic development for which the coun­
tries that are developed today took more than a 
century to accomplish under more favorable con­
ditions. As a matter of fact this threat still hangs 
over India.
In consideration of such pressures, a quarter cen­
tury scheme of economic development was adopted 
in 1951, under a strategy of «five year plans».
Ill
The First Five Year Plan 1951 to 1956
With the attainment of independence in 1947, the 
need for a planned development of the Indian eco­
nomy became urgent, for reasons outlined earlier. 
Due to the burdens of partition and other politi­
cal exigencies the formal inauguration of planning 
was delayed until the establishment of the planning 
Commission in March 1950 (by a resolution of the 
government of India) under the chairmanship of 
Mr. Nehru, the then Prime Minister of India.
5. Government of India, Planning Commission, Third 
Five Year Plan, Draft Outline, 1960, p. 84.
6. Mahalanobis, P.C., Next Step in Planning, Sankya, 
New Delhi. January, 1960, p. 9.
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Assignment of the Planning Commission
The Planning Commission has been charged with 
the dual responsibility of first making a thorough 
assessment of both the tangible and intangible re­
sources of the country, and of formulating a plan 
for the most effective and balanced utilization of 
the country's resources. It is supposed to determine 
the relative priorities and allocate the resources 
for their completion, to indicate the retarding fac­
tors in the economic development and the necessary 
conditions under the existing socio-political frame­
work for the successful execution of plans. It 
has also to help in evolving a proper machinery for 
the implementation, appraisal and evaluation of the 
progress achieved. In addition to this, the Planning 
Commission has also been assigned the task of 
giving advice on problems referred to it by Central 
or State Governments. Thus in a nutshell, the Plan­
ning Commission is assigned the tremendously im­
portant task of formulation, phasing, implementa­
tion, and evaluation of planned programs.1
In keeping with its assigned task, the Planning 
Commission in July, 1951, presented a draft out­
line of the plan covering a period of five years (from 
April 1951 to March 1956). The principal objectives 
of the planning as a whole were set out over 
a spread of about 25 years, of which the first five 
year plan marked a beginning. The prime objective 
of planning was to create a congenial atmosphe­
re in which the living standards are reasonably high, 
and all citizens immaterial of sex, may have full 
and equal opportunity for growth and service. Sec­
ond, it was decided that simultaneously a steady 
advance should be made towards the realization 
of wider objectives, such as full employment and 
the removal of economic inequalities. Thus maxi­
mum production, full employment, the attainment of 
economic equality and social justice constituted the 
overall accepted objective of planning.2
The first five year plan had dual objectives: first, 
of correcting the disequilibrium in the economy 
caused by the war and the partition of the country; 
second, it attempted to provide simultaneously for 
an all round balanced development, which would 
insure a rising national income and a steady improve­
ment in living standard over a period of five years.3
However, the first five year plan was based on 
three assumptions:
1. That population would grow at the rate of 1.25 
per cent per annum (which was the rate record­
ed in the last decennial Census) prior to 1951.
1. India, Planning Commission, First Five Year Plant 
pp. 1 to 6.
2. First Five Year Plan, p. 28.
3. Review of the First Five Year Plan, May 1957, p. 1.
2. That postulating the capital output ratio of 3:1.4
3. That the rate of saving as a proportion of to­
tal national income would go up from 5 per 
cent in the base year 1950-51 to 6s/4 per cent 
in 1955-56 to about 11 per cent by 1960-61, and 
20 per cent by 1967-68.5
On these assumptions, it was asserted that the 
national income could be expected to double in 22 
years by 1972, with per capita income doubled in 
27 years, that is by 1977, or in five years more than 
the period required for doubling the national in­
come. It was estimated that over these 27 years 
consumption standards were to rise by a little over 
70 per cent as compared to the 1950-51 level.6
However, the Planning Commission failed to 
make any positive prediction regarding employment; 
nevertheless, under the guise of reservations they ob­
served that «eliminating unemployment in an under­
developed economy is by its nature a somewhat 
long term problem which calls for the steady and 
persistent effort». During the period of the first 
plan, according to the Planning Commission, «Con­
siderable progress will have been made in expand­
ing irrigation, power, basic industries, transport and 
other services and these will provide directly as 
well as indirectly, new avenues of employment».7
These estimates, as was pointed out by the Plan­
ning Commission, were considered illustrative and 
intended only to indicate broadly the implication in 
terms of the assumed behavior of the various pa­
rameters over a period of time. On the basis of 
these assumed parameters, along with the detail 
assessment of both the tangible and intangible re­
sources of the country, the Planning Commission 
decided on the relative priorities in the first five 
year plan.
Relative Priorities in the First Plan
A detailed study of the magnitude of the relative 
priorities over the major heads (between agricultur­
al and nonagricultural sector) shows clearly that 
the top most priority was given to the development 
of agriculture, including irrigation and power, which 
formed a little over 44 per cent of the aggregate out­
lay in the plan, as shown in table 1.
In determining the distribution of outlay between 
agricultural sectors and nonagricultural sectors, the 
main considerations taken into account by the Plan­
ning Commission were:
1. The need for initiating a process of development
4. Planning Commission, First Five Year Plan, p. 22.
5. First Five Year Plan, p. 21.
6. First Five Year Plan, p. 21-22.
7. First Five Year Plan, p. 23.
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TABLE 1. The Allocation of Resources in the Order Priority*
RS in P.C. of 
gross total
Agriculture and community development 361 17.5
Irrigation 168 8.1
Multipurpose irrigation projects 266 12.9
Power 127 6.1
Transport and communication 497 24.0
Industry 173 8.4
Social Services 340 16.4
Rehabilitation 85 4.1
Others 52 2.5
Total 2,069 100.0
♦Source: First Five Year Plan, P.3, p.33.
that would form the basis for the much larger 
efforts needed in the future.
2. The necessity of completing the projects initiat­
ed by the Central and State Governments prior 
to the commencement of the plan.
3. The realization that without a substantial increase 
in the levels of food and raw materials produc­
tions, it would be impossible to make a break 
through in industrial sector.
4. The need to correct maladjustments in the eco­
nomy caused by the war and partition.
In view of these considerations the Planning Com­
mission laid heavy emphasis on agricultural devel­
opment by allocating 44.6 per cent of the total ex­
penditure.
The emphasis on agricultural development was jus­
tified by the Planning Commission on the follow­
ing grounds:
1. First, the Planning Commission asserted that 
there is an immediate need to initiate a process 
of development that will form a basis for fu­
ture development. For without a substantial in­
crease in the production of food and raw ma­
terials a higher tempo of industrial development 
cannot be long sustained. Furthermore, the real­
ization that an increase in agricultural output 
would not only serve as a stimulus for expan­
sion in other sectors, but would also help to 
save, if not also earn, the foreign exchange need­
ed for the purchase of capital equipment from 
other countries.
2. Second, in spite of the fact that a large pro­
portion of the total population remain engaged 
in agriculture (about 70 per cent) there was 
still a shortage of food and agriculture raw ma­
terials. This state of affairs demanded immediate 
attention.
3. Third, the lack of adequate investment funds 
to launch any major development of the indus­
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TABLE 2. Imports of Food Grains during 1946-1950-1951*
Year
Quantity in 
million 
tons
1946 2.25
1947 2.35
1948 2.85
1949 3.74
1950 2.13
1951 4.72
Total 18.04
♦Source: Raj Narain Gupta, Indian Economics Year Book, p. 62.
trial sector encouraged the development of agri­
cultural sector, which can be developed to a 
large extent with a limited capital, for the capi­
tal output ratio in agriculture is less than 2:1 
as against 3:1 in industry.
4. Finally, the most important factor which influ­
enced the Planning Commission’s decision was 
an attempt to reduce imports of food and indus­
trial raw materials.
Between 1946-59 the total imports of agricultural 
products amounted to 18 million tons valued at more 
than 122 million dollars. Table 2 shows the quan­
tity of food imports made by India in the years 
1946 to 1950-51.
Therefore, in the view of the Planning Commission, 
the reduction in such imports and the saving of such 
imports depended upon the development of agri­
cultural sector.
The Planning Commission concluded that «for the 
immediate five year period, agriculture, irrigation 
and power, must in ou«· view have the top-most prior­
ity».1 For one thing, this emphasis is indicated 
by the need to complete projects in hand. But, fur­
ther, «we are convinced that without a substantial 
increase in the production of food and raw materi­
als needed for industry, it would be impossible to 
sustain a higher tempo of industrial development. 
In an under-developed economy with low yields in 
agriculture, there is of course no real conflict between 
agricultural and industrial development. One can­
not go far without the other; the two are comple­
mentary. It is necessary, however, on economy as 
well as on other grounds, first of all to strengthen 
the economy at the base and to create conditions 
of sufficiency and even plentitude in respect to food 
and raw materials. These are the wherewithals for 
further development».2
1. Government of India, Planning Commission, First 
Five Year Plan, p. 44,
2. First Five Year Plan, p. 44.
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Thus as a part of an overall development strate­
gy, the Planning Commission not only contemplat­
ed on physical outlays to increase agricultural pro­
ductivity but also recognized that there was need 
for reorganizing the entire agricultural sector. Thus 
the planners proposed various measures to remove 
any impediments which may obstruct the goal of 
increasing agricultural productivity.
The first plan laid down a land policy intended 
to secure an increase in agricultural production. 
This land policy meant in essence virtually the com­
plete abolition of intermediate interests (such as 
Zamindari and other forms of intermediate interests 
in land) restricting the scope of ownership of land, 
security for cultivators against outside hazards and 
finally making the tenant the ultimate owner of the 
land he tills.
In addition to Land Reforms, the Planning Com­
mission also proposed the construction of more ir­
rigation works, and reclamation, with intensive farm­
ing based on the methods of cooperative village man­
agement, community development projects, and ru­
ral extension schemes. Furthermore, the Planning 
Commission made detailed references to the reform 
of the organizations for providing agricultural cred­
it, better marketing facilities for agricultural prod­
ucts, to a better system of animal husbandry, dairy­
ing and horticulture, increase in the forest areas 
and soil conservation practices, and lastly to the 
necessity of developing and exploiting fishing oper­
ations.
These, in brief, are the main proposals which were 
made in the first five year plan, with respect to de­
veloping the agricultural sector of the Indian eco­
nomy.
Industrial Development
With regard to the industrial development prog­
ram, the private sector was assigned a dominant 
place. In India there were at that time consumer 
goods industries as cotton and jute textiles, paper, 
soap, sugar, etc., but there were scarcely any basic 
industries—steel, chemicals, etc. Without well - 
developed basic industries, no large country like In­
dia can hope to progress economically. But the In­
dian Government could not embark on such in­
dustries, during the first plan period, because of 
other pressing preoccupations.
According to the Industrial Policy Statement of 
1948, while certain industries like arms and ammu­
nition were to be the state’s exclusive monopoly, 
coal, iron and steel, aircraft manufactures, ship 
building and manufactures of telephones, telegraph 
and wireless apparatus were to be developed by the 
Central and State Governments and other public
authorities, if necessary with the cooperation of 
private enterprise. For the rest, private enterprise 
was free to operate as it pleased, except that the 
state could intervene in an emergency. Pride of place 
was given to the private sector in the iron and 
steel industry. The private sector was expected also 
to develop the consumer goods industries, such as 
textiles, sugar, paper, salt, and paper board, sheet 
glass, vegetable oils.
Thus some large scale industries were left in the 
hands of private investors.
Criticism
The first five year plan was naturally subjected 
to various specific criticisms. They were:
(a) The Plan gave a much greater importance to 
agricultural development than to industrial on the 
ground of completing the several already establish­
ed projects in hand in order to create a strong ba­
sis for subsequent industrial development. Some 
critics held that they had proceeded upon the wrong 
assumption in placing heavy emphasis on agricul­
tural development. This was asserted to imply that 
Indian industry had already developed to the ex­
tent that the existing agricultural development would 
justify. This, however, was not the case. Anyone 
familiar with Indian conditions (at the time of the 
formulation of the first five year plan) with regard 
to the then existing output of agricultural raw ma­
terials and foodstuffs, etc., could easily understand 
the real significance of attaching more importance 
to the development of agriculture, under the first 
plan, than to the development of industry. Subse­
quently for the same reason the point was made 
that India could have attained a much bigger indus­
trial development of the country, even with the 
existing deficit gaps in agricultural production. This 
can be regarded as an unsound and unhealthy cri­
ticism of the overall strategy of the plan.
(b) The plan also left industrial development most­
ly in the hands of the private enterprise. There 
was no harm in this as business enterprise in the 
past was entirely in the hands of private corpora­
tions. But the criticism against the plan was that, 
while leaving the industrial development mostly to 
the private sectors and specifying targets of out­
put, it did not provide sufficient resources for the 
use of private enterprise.1 Moreover, industry need­
ed not only finance but also many other facilities. 
Their supporters argued for such privileges as ex­
emption from taxation, greater depreciation allow­
ances, and in certain cases, such subsidies, etc. The 
critics held that it was not possible for private en­
terprise to do full justice to industrial development.
1. Lalwani, N.P., Planning in India, 1955, p. 39.
179
http://epublishing.ekt.gr | e-Publisher: EKT | Downloaded at 20/02/2020 23:09:31 |
Έπιθεώρηαις Κοινωνικών ’Ερευνών δ' τρίμηνον 1973
(c) Third, one of the serious defects of the first 
plan was its excessive emphasis on long-period pro­
jects; yet there is no doubt that in a planned econo­
my weight has to be given to long term projects. 
In some foreign countries, of which the USSR is 
the best example, long term projects formed the 
main basis of planning. But conditions in India at 
the time of the formulation of the plan were very 
difficult. Although the plan needed to have a number 
of long term projects, the chief emphasis should 
have been on short term schemes. This would 
have made it possible to increase the yield of crops 
per acre of land more quickly and to secure a great­
er measure of self-sufficiency in food grains in a 
much shorter time.
Another likely disadvantage o(' placing greater em­
phasis on long term projects has been that the 
supply of goods, as a result of stepped-up in­
vestment (under the plan) increased only slowly 
but the purchasing power in the hands of the people 
increased at once. This had the result of intensify­
ing inflationary conditions. A certain degree of 
inflation and consequently rising prices were inev­
itable in a planned economy. But if stepped up in­
vestment had increased the supply of goods in the 
market, the inflationary forces would have been 
counteracted. This would have been possible if prop­
er emphasis were placed in the plan on short term 
projects. In the absence of this, the plan resulted 
in intensifying inflation much to the detriment of 
the consumer.
(d) Fourth, the success of any plan depends in 
part upon the efficiency of the organization which 
is set up to make it operational. It was a great weak­
ness of India’s first five year plan that it did not 
set up any special organization for implementing 
the plan. Some industrial and river valley projects 
were placed in charge of autonomous corpora­
tions over which the Government had very little 
control, with the consequence that much public 
money was wasted, the schemes had to be revised 
frequently, and production did not increase as was 
expected.
But on the whole, in spite of these shortcomings in 
the plan, there is no doubt that India’s first five year 
plan was a brave effort at solving the country’s 
economic problems. Progress under the plan was 
slow. But this marked the beginning of a more 
concentrated effort to increase agricultural and 
non-agricultural production and the per capita in­
come of the people.
Second Five Year Plan 1956-1961
The progress recorded during the first five year 
plan period can not be regarded as more than a
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modest beginning of the process of generating dyna­
mism in the economy. Also in view of the broad 
objective of a planned economic development, con­
sisting of maximum production, full employment and 
higher living standards, the achievements of the 
first plan can be considered no more than as piece­
meal effort. Therefore, at the time of the formu­
lation of the second five year plan, it was felt nec­
essary to achieve a more balanced economic devel­
opment. This interpretation seems to have been in­
fluenced by the tremendous increase (of about 20 
per cent) in agricultural production during the first 
five year plan period. Furthermore, towards the end 
of the first five year plan (in March 1956), the Gov­
ernment of India declared the new industrial po­
licy resolution1 in which an expanding role was 
assigned to the public sector. Simultaneously the 
parliament had accepted the «socialistic pattern of 
society»2 as the objective of social and economic 
policy. These significant developments influenced the 
overall directions and objectives envisaged in the 
second five year plan.
Growth Model
At the time of the formulation of the second plan, 
the planners had to reformulate their long-term 
growth model, in the light of the performance of 
the first five year plan. The first five year plan gave 
a projection of economic growth over a period 
of 30 years from 1951-1981. In this growth model 
it was envisaged that national income (in 1950-51) 
could be doubled by 1970-71, and the per capita in­
come by 1977-78.3 In view of the impressive per­
formance in the first plan it was concluded that the 
national income could be doubled by 1967-68 and the 
per capita income by 1973-74." But this projection was 
once again based on unrealistic assumptions, with 
regard to population growth, capital output ratios, 
and savings and investment. The planners project­
ed that, during the period of second five year plan, 
population would continue to increase at the rate 
of 1.25 per cent (which was far from the actual fig­
ure). Though consideration has been taken of the 
increase in population and its trends, but even with 
a continual rate of growth in national income of 
more than 5 per cent per annum, it would seem 
impossible to attain the target of doubling 1950- 
51 level even by the end of fifth plan period.
With regard to the capital output ratio, in view 
of highly favorable capital output ratio of 1.8:1
1. Second five year plan, p. 28.
2. Second five year plan, p. 21.
3. First plan, p. 20.
4. Second plan, p. 11.
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realized during the first plan, the planners for the 
second five year plan contemplated that an «invest­
ment of 6,200 crores is expected to result in an in­
crease in national income of 2,680 crores. This gives 
a capital output ratio of 2:3. For the third, fourth 
and fifth plan period, we have in the present model 
assumed capital output ratio of 2:6, 3:4 and 3:7 
respectively».1
As regards the additional employment opportuni­
ty, the planners indicated the possibility to create 
about 10 million more jobs outside agriculture dur­
ing the second five year plan period. Actually the 
additional employment to be created during the sec­
ond plan was estimated at about 6.5 million out­
side agriculture.2 3 At the end of the second plan, 
the backlog of unemployment was estimated to be 
prospectively 9 million.
Objectives
The second five year plan had been formulated 
with reference to the following four objectives:8
(a) A sizeable increase in national income so as to 
raise the level of living in the country;
(b) Rapid industrialization with particular empha­
sis on the development of basic and heavy indus­
tries;
(c) A large expansion of employment opportunites;and
(d) Reduction of inequalities in income and wealth 
and a more even distribution of economic power.
These objectives in the words of the Planning Com­
mission are interrelated and interdependent. A rise in 
the levels of living and sizeable increase in nation­
al income of the order of 25 per cent over the five 
years cannot be secured without increase in produc­
tion and investment. The substantial increase will 
not come about without building up economic and 
social overheads and establishment of heavy and 
basic industries. In a country with surplus man­
power expansion of employment opportunities at a 
rate sufficient to absorb the increase in labor force 
assumes crucial importance. For this purpose a 
program or proper utilization and technical train­
ing becomes imperative. Further, the process and 
design of development should result in bringing a- 
bout a certain basic change in social values and pur­
poses. The reduction of economic and social ine­
qualities should be achieved through democratic 
means. These objectives in the words of Planning 
Commission should be pursued in an even manner 
because too much emphasis on one at the cost of 
another may damage the economy and jeopardize
1. Second, five year plan, p. 9.
2. Third five year plan, p. 4.
3. Second five year plan, p. 24.
the realization of the objectives. However, the said 
objectives, though they appeared sound in view of 
the inventory of the Indian economy, were too am­
bitious. They led the entire economy during the lat­
ter half of the second plan period into a perplexing 
situation.
The Order of Priority
In the light of the broad objectives of the second 
plan, the planners assigned topmost priority to 
rapid industrialization and diversification of the 
economy. According to the Planning Commission/if 
industrialization is to be rapid enough, the country 
must aim at development industries and industries 
which make the machines needed for further devel­
opment. This calls for substantial expansion in iron 
and steel, non-ferrous metals, coal, cement, heavy 
chemicals and other industries of basic importance. 
The limitation in contemplating this type of devel­
opment of basic industries before the Planning 
Commission was the scarcity of resources and the 
many claims on them. But in view of the fact that 
the criterion is not merely meeting immediate needs 
but the continuing and expanding needs in the com­
ing years, the Planning Commission decided that 
it was desirable to aim at proceeding farthest in 
the direction of developing heavy and capital goods 
industries, which conform to this criterion.1 The 
primary considerations were:
(a) That agriculture and irrigation have already 
made considerable progress in the first plan period, 
and that we can afford to devote more attention to 
industries which had been comparatively neglected.
(b) With an expanding population it would not be 
possible to solve the problem of unemployment and 
under-employment in the country, if we confined 
our attention mainly to agricultural development: 
and
(c) The realization of the fact that the economic 
prosperity of the country in the long run is linked 
up with industrialization.
The Planning Commission, thus justified the shift 
in emphasis from the development of agriculture in 
the first plan to the development of basic and heavy 
industries, without giving adequate reasons.· for 
this shift of emphasis, in the whole planning volume. 
It is said by Mr. Jaya Prakash Narain, the op­
position party leader, that the preparation of the plan 
by 'experts close to Professor Mahalanobis (chief 
architect and engineer of the second plan) were 
foreigners mostly sympathetic to Soviet Russia or 
her satellite countries. It was perhaps for this reason
4. Second five year plan, pp. 24-25.
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that Mr. Marain, in the Indian parliament was re­
ported to have remarked that «The seven authors 
of the Pandit Nehru’s second plan are all men from 
behind the iron curtain».1
Wrong Assumptions
Generally speaking the rate of per capita economic 
growth of a country apart from psychological and so­
ciological factors depends mainly upon (1) the rate of 
growth of population; (2) the rate of growth of capital 
formation; and (3) the capital output ratio. In the cal­
culation of these parameters the Planning Commis­
sion made grave errors at the time of the formu­
lation of the second five year plan. As we have point­
ed out earlier the Planning Commission had assum­
ed the rate of growth of population at 1.25 per 
cent per annum, the rate of investment of 5 per cent 
of the national income and the capital output ratio 
as 3:1 with a time lag of two years. While reviewing 
the progress of the first plan the Commission not­
ed that these assumptions were not realized, and 
therefore, they should be altered for purposes of 
future planning. It is here that the Commission 
committed an error of judgment, both initially and 
finally.
To start with, the Planning Commission once 
again underestimated the rate of growth of popula­
tion during the second plan period, as they had 
done under the first. As they retained the assump­
tion that the rate of growth of population would 
continue to rise at 1.25 per cent per annum, when 
it was actually rising at the rate close to 2 per cent 
(according to 1961 Census).
Regarding the capital coefficients the Planning 
Commission calculated that there has been a rise 
of about 18 per cent in the national income during 
the plan period. The rate of investment as percentage 
of the national output was calculated to have ris­
en from 4.9 per cent in 1950-51 to 7.3 per cent in 
1955-56. National income at 1952-53 prices rose 
from Rs. 9,110 crores in 1950-51 to Rs. 10,800 cro- 
res in 1955-56, that is a rise of Rs. 1,700 crores 
over the five year period. During this period invest­
ment was estimated to be at Rs. 3,100 crores. This 
gives an incremental capital output ratio as 1.8:1 
as against 3:1 assumed by the Planning Commission 
for the first plan. The Commission had been em­
boldened by the favorable results and for the next 
five years has made calculations assuming a capital 
coefficient of 2.3:1.
The Commission was not justified in this assump­
tion. It had not taken all factors into considera­
1. Democratic Research Service, Bombay, «Danger of 
Physical Planning», p. 7.
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tion in working out the capital coefficient for the 
second five year plan. Increases in national output 
during the first plan period were not wholly attri­
butable to investment. Favorable monsoons gave 
us good crops for two successive years. There was 
also an increase in production due to utilization 
of formerly unutilized capacity.
Finally, the planners (under miscalculations) seem 
to have neglected interindustry relations in assign­
ing top priority to industrialization. It is from this 
point of view that the whole planning structure (of 
the second five year plan) seems to be more highly 
idealistic than factual. For it is the same planners 
who later on, especially during the last two years 
of the second five year plan, realized their grave mis­
take in placing heavy emphasis on the development 
of basic industries. In fact the hard experience of 
the second five year plan has shown the rate of 
growth in agricultural industry to be one of limit­
ing factors in the progress of the Indian economy. 
Especially the main factor responsible for the fail­
ure of the second five year plan was the slow growth 
of agricultural sector. It is this realization that 
brought the planners back to their senses at the 
time of the formulation of the third five year plan. 
This led them to shift the emphasis from a rapid 
industrialization of the country under the second 
five year plan to the development of agriculture 
under the third.
Third Five Year Pian 1901-1966
The beginning of the third five year plan on A- 
pril 1, 1961, marked the completion of a decade 
of planned development strategy. The basic approach 
of the third five year plan directly follows from the 
pattern adopted in the second plan. However, in 
taking a long range view of the economy in general, 
the third plan was directed towards strengthening 
the agricultural economy, along with a balance de­
velopment of industries, power and transport. Thus 
in formulating the third plan the planners contem­
plated the following principal objectives in defining 
the core of the plan:
(1) To secure an increase in national income of 
over 5 per cent per annum, the pattern of develop­
ment being designed also to sustain this rate of 
growth during subsequent plan periods.
(2) To achieve self sufficiency in food grains and 
increase agricultural production to meet the re­
quirements of industry and exports; and
(3) To expand basic industries like steel, chemical 
industries, fuel and power and to establish a machine 
building capacity so that the requirements of fur­
ther industrialization could be met within a period 
of 10 years or so mainly from the country’s own
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resources. It is with reference to these objectives, 
along with the revised version of long term growth 
model, that the specific targets were laid down in 
the plan for the principal items under agriculture, 
industry, transport and communication.
Long Term Growth Model ( Revised)
It may be recalled that in the second five year 
plan, the Planning Commission had presented a 
long term projection of economic growth—the re­
vised version of an earlier projection presented in 
the first plan. According to this revised projection, 
the 1950-51 level of national income should be dou­
bled by 1967-68 (a period of 17 years) and that of 
the per capita income should be doubled by 1973- 
74 (a period of 23 years). It was in accordance with 
this projection that against the 18 per cent increase 
in national income brought about by the first plan, 
targets of 25 per cent, 29 per cent and 26 per cent 
were set for second, third and fourth plans respecti­
vely. As the second plan achievement fell short of 
the target, the long term projection had to be recon­
sidered at the time of formulating the third plan.
It is estimated under the new projection that over 
the next 15 years population will increase by alitile 
over 2 per cent per annum. The growth of popula­
tion of this order will entail expanding demands 
for food grains, raw materials, transport, employ­
ment, education and the like.1
With regard to employment, the Planning Com­
mission asserted that the progress included in the 
third plan is expected to provide employment op­
portunities for about 14 million people. But in view 
of the sharp increase in population, the number of 
new entrants to the labor force during the third 
plan period will be as many as 17 million2 (along 
with a backlog of unemployment inherited from the 
second plan to the tune of about 9 million), the prob­
lem of unemployment will not decrease by the end 
of the third plan. Rather it was bound to increase.
Pattern of Priority under the Third Plan
The pattern of investment embodied in the third 
five year plan reflects the priorities and the relative 
emphasis in different sectors during the plan pe­
riod. In turn, these derive as much from an assess­
ment of the current economic situation and the 
likely trends as from the analysis of the basic eco­
nomic and social problems of the country and the 
long term goals of national endeavor.
However, contrary to the emphasis of industrial-
1. Third, five year plan, p. 27.
2. Third five year plan, p. 74.
TABLE 3. Comparative Distribution of Plan Outlay in Different 
Sectors in the Second and Third Five Year Plans*
Second
plan
Third
plan
Second
plan
Third
plan
1. Agriculture and commu­
nity development co-ope­
ration 530 1,068 11 14
2. Major and medium irriga­
tion 420 650 9 9
3. Power 445 1,012 10 13
4. Village and small industries 175 264 4 4
5. Industry and minerals 900 1,520 20 20
6. Transport and communi­
cation 1,300 1,486 28 20
7. Social services and miscel­
laneous 830 1,300 18 17
8. Inventories — 200 — 3
Total 4,600 7,500 100 100
» Ibid., p. 8.
ization, under the second plan, the third plan gives 
prime priority to the development of agriculture, as 
under the first plan. This shift of emphasis from the 
development of industries under the second plan to 
the development of agriculture under the third is 
of considerable significance to the development strat­
egy of Indian economy as a whole. For experience 
in the first two, especially in the second, it has shown 
that the rate of growth in agricultural industry is 
one of the limiting factors in the progress of Indi­
an economy. Agricultural production has, therefore, 
to be increased to the largest extent feasible. 
Further in view of the fact that:
1. India is primarily an agricultural country;
2. Her population is expected to grow at the rate 
close to 2.0 per cent per annum, and
3. In the light of existing deficit in agricultural 
raw materials and food products, it is fitting 
that the Planning Commission should assign 
top priority to the development of agriculture 
during the third plan period.
Table 3 gives clear indication of the importance 
attached by the Planning Commission to the devel­
opment of agriculture during the third plan, in terms 
of allocating a greater percentage of plan outlay.
Agriculture under the Third Plan
In the scheme of development (according to the 
Planning Commission) the first priority necessari­
ly belongs to agriculture. The importance of achiev­
ing self-sufficiency in food, and meeting the require­
ments of agricultural industries and exports were 
among the major aims of third plan.3 Furthermore, 
the Planning Commission made quite clear its as-
3. Third five year plan, p. 49.
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sessment of the role of agriculture in the total econ­
omy of the country, by asserting that the level of 
agricultural production is an important determinant 
of the rate of growth of the economy as a whole. 
It was further envisaged by the Commission that, 
as the plan proceeds (apart from financial outlay 
already provided in the plan), if larger resources 
are needed for assuring more rapid advance with­
in the rural economy, these will be made available.
In addition to making a rapid headway (in the 
development of agricultural sector through exten­
sive net work of community development projects, 
with a basic aim of popularizing the operation of 
co-operative farming) the Planning Commission re­
commended from the technical point of view, five 
major programs around which intensive work was 
to be organized in an effort to develop agricultural 
production. They were: 1. irrigation; 2. soil con­
servation; 3. dry farming, and land reclamation; 4. 
supply of fertilizers and manures; and 5. better 
ploughs and improved implements.
Proposed Agricultural Targets under the Third Plan1 2
Agricultural production under the third year plan 
period is to be stepped up by 30 to 33 per cent. 
The specific targets of production proposed for var­
ious commodities are as follows:
TABLE 4. Proposed Targets for the Production of Various 
Commodities between 1960-61 to 1965-1966
Commodities 
(million tons)
Annual production 
1960-1961 1965-1966
1. Food grains 75 100-105
2. Oil seeds 7.2 9.2-9.5
3. Sugar cane 7.2 9.0-9.2
4. Cotton 5.4 7.2
5. Jute 5.5 6.5
In addition to the above targets, it has also been 
proposed to increase the production of food ar­
ticles, including fruits and vegetables, milk, fish, 
meat, eggs, etc.
The target proposed for the production of food 
grains would allow for consumption of about 15 
ounces of cereals and 3 ounces of pulses percapita 
per day, besides providing some margin against 
emergencies.3
Achievement of the Third Plan
According to an early estimate of the central sta­
tistical organization, in 1964 the real national in­
1. Third five year plan, p. 62.
2. Third five year plan, p. 63.
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come of the country was increasing at the rate of 2.5 
per cent, against the annual target of 5.6 per cent 
set by the plan. As the former is about equal to 
the rate of increase in population, no improvement 
is occurring in the per capita income, over the plan 
period. On the face of it, this is a picture of economic 
stagnation. However, the movement of national in­
come in any one, two or three years cannot, by 
itself, indicate the strength underlying the forces gov­
erning the economy. Let us, therefore, look at the 
picture more closely.
Agriculture: The third plan had set a target of 27 
per cent increase in overall agricultural production. 
But production had been almost static, when com­
pared to the 1960 high of 81 million tons. In 1964 
it is even less 79.5 million.3 Also there are 40 mil­
lion more mouths to feed than four years ago. This 
has all been happening, against the target of 26 per 
cent increase set for food grains output over the 
plan period. Taking all food grains together the 
area of cultivated land showed little change; with 
output remaining the same, the yield per acre has 
remained stagnant. Agricultural raw materials are 
displaying divergent trends. The output of cotton 
fell by 17 per cent while that of jute rose by 57 per 
cent. But the increase in jute production was achiev­
ed mainly by enlarging the cultivated area rather 
than by increasing the yield per acre. This meant 
diversion of land from other crops, particularly 
rice.4
On the whole food production has stagnated be­
cause of successive bad crops in the plan period. 
Some major part of this may be attributed to the 
erratic monsoons that brought either too much rain 
or not enough.
Nonagriculture : Though the agricultural sector has 
so far under the third plan period proved to be 
static, the industrial picture has been little brighter. 
The general index of industrial production advanc­
ed by 16.6 per cent, as against the growth rate of 
11.2 per cent stipulated under the plan. We often 
hear that the index of industrial production, as at 
present compiled, understates the real industrial 
progress of the country as it gives an undue weight 
to certain traditional industries and also leaves out 
of account many new industries established after 
1951. This is no doubt a valid point, but a closer 
look at some important industries which could claim 
to constitute the «core» of the industrial plan do 
not create more favorable impressions.
3. Mellow, John H. and Lele, «Alternative Trends in 
Food Grain Production in India», Economic Development of 
Cultural Change, Vol. XIII, No. 2, January 1965, p. 222.
4. Government of India, Central Statistical Bureau, Cal­
cutta Crop Index, p. 39.
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Finished Steel: Output rose from 2.4 million tons 
in 1960-61 to 3.5 million tons in 1963-64. This 48 
per cent increase is, on the face of it, encouraging 
but this is still below the second plan target of 4 1 /2 
million tons and a far cry from the target of 7 mil­
lion tons set for the last year of the third plan.
Cement: Production recorded a niggardly advance 
of a little over 7 per cent from 8 million tons to 
8.6 million tons. The plan has envisaged a near 
doubling of output from 8 to 15 million tons by 
1965-66.1
The plan laid a great stress on fertilizers, which 
have a direct bearing on agricultural production. 
But the production of ammonium sulphate, which 
could be considered as a representative of the fer­
tilizer group, is found to have made a marginal 
gain during the plan period. The plan had envisag­
ed a trebling of output.2
Furthermore, we may consider the employment in­
dex in the nonagricultural sector, as a positive sign 
of industrial development. The plan has badly 
failed in creating new employment opportunities in 
nonagricultural sectors that the gain from plan­
ning in the field of employment is negligible.3 The 
additional employment resulting from the first plan, 
outside of agriculture was 4.7 million and from 
the second plan 6.5 million—an improvement of 
about 35 per cent despite the steep rise of 110 per 
cent in the investment outlay from Rs. 3,760 cro- 
res in the first plan to Rs. 7,900 crores in the second. 
The increase in employment being less than the nat­
ural additions to the labor force. The second plan, 
thus bequeaths to the third plan vastly more unem­
ployment—9 million, that is inherited from the 
first plan. All calculations in this respect were bas­
ed on a population increase of five million per 
year, of which the labor force was assumed to 40 
per cent. But this has been upset by the discovery 
by the 1961 Census that the population increase 
during the past decade has been actually at an an­
nual rate 1.9 per cent. And as of today, even accept­
ing the Planning Commission’s view that it is pos­
sible to create 14 million new jobs during the plan 
period, in view of the sharp rise in population, at 
the close of the third plan period, the unemployment 
backlog may rise to 12 million.4 But here again, if we 
consider the employment trend under the first three 
years of the plan period, we realized a much higher 
backlog of unemployment at the end of the third
1. Third jive year plan, p. 486.
2. Third five year plan, p. 478.
3. Shenoy, B.R., Indian Planning and Economic Develop­
ment, p. 23.
4. Third five year plan, p. 156.
plan than the 12 million figure indicated by the 
Planning Commission.
The one important question that emerges from 
this unhealthy employment prospect is whether in 
the future these unemployed millions are ever 
going to find jobs—are they to be put on relief, 
or find some gainful employment in nonagricultural 
pursuits or will they be made to depend upon agri­
culture. As of today indications are that in spite 
of a steep rise in plan investment the prospect of 
finding any feasible opportunity to employ all the 
entrants to labor force is pretty dark, thereby force­
fully pushing them to depend upon already over­
burdened agriculture as a residual solution. Fortu­
nately, the backbone of the Indian society and the 
Indian culture does provide for such an existence 
(for instance the most powerful age old institution 
of joint family existence, is a good example of such 
an array of institutions).
The Fourth Five Year Plan 1909-1974
According to a quarter century scheme of economic 
development as originally envisaged by the Planning 
Commission in 1951, the fourth plan was schedul­
ed to begin on April 1, 1966. Though the first 
draft of the plan was prepared as early as 1965, 
the plan never got off the ground. Later on it was 
declared that the fourth plan would start only in 
1969-70. There was to be a three year period of 
«Plan Floliday»,5 an idea conceived by Lai Bhadur 
Shastri, the then prime minister and chairman of 
the Planning Commission. On close examination it 
is clear that such an action was a product of unex­
pected circumstances brought about by the conflict 
with China in 1962 and with Pakistan in 1965 fol­
lowed by a temporary suspension of foreign aid,6 
the devaluation in 1966, the failure of the monsoons, 
and the general election in 1967.
However, during this three year period of «Plan 
Holiday» in the interest of continuity, the Planning 
Commission adopted annual plans on a modest 
scale both in terms of total outlay and goals. As a 
result national income rose only by 1.1 per cent 
and the index of industrial production registered 
only 1.7 per cent in 1966-67 and 0.31 in 1967-68 
and finally rose by 6 per cent in 1968-69. Whereas 
national income also registered an increase of 9 
per cent in 1968-69 as compared to 1.1 per cent 
in 1966-67.’
5. Pillai, Narayana, «Unplanning the Plan», Far Eastern 
Economic Review, 58:448-50 (December 7, 1967), p. 448.
6. Derek, Davis, «A Cart Without a Horse», Far Eastern 
Economic Review, 56:305-8 (May 11, 1967), pp. 306-307.
7. Publication Division, India 1969, Government of India,
pp. 211-212.
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Against these achievements under the annual 
plans, the fourth five year plan was finally started 
in 1969 on a solid foundation. It envisaged an out­
lay more or less equal to that in the past eight years. 
Compared to earlier plans, therefore, the anticipat­
ed tempo of expansion is not as high when the out­
lays are deflated by the increase in price level since 
1960, nearly 70 per cent when the fourth plan was 
finalized; the allocations in real terms in some im­
portant sectors are lower than in the third plan, for 
instance; the allocation of Rs. 236 crores and Rs. 
293 crores for village and small-scale industries, 
and of Rs. 142 crores for the welfare of the back­
ward classes. Thus with 70 per cent price deflator, 
in real terms the fourth plan is no larger than 
the previous plan.
Objectives
In the interest of growth-with-stability the by­
word of the fourth plan, the Planning Commission 
has adopted the following five broad objectives: 
(1) introduction of safeguards against fluctuations 
of agricultural production as well as uncertainties 
of foreign aid; (2) a sustained increase in export 
by about seven per cent annually to secure balanc­
ed foreign trade; (3) limiting industrial activity 
and achieving efficiency and profitability of public 
enterprises; (4) stepping up the tempo of economic 
activity to such an extent that may bring about 
more productive employment maintaining a stable 
and self-reliant economy, and (5) accentuate the 
process of industrial dispersal and stimulate the 
economy of weaker and less developed areas through 
regional and local planning processes.1
The Planning Commission hope to achieve these 
objectives by assigning heavy emphasis to agricul­
ture, fertilizers, and steel output. The core of the 
Plan is undoubtedly agriculture. The agricultural 
plan has been carefully formulated. Its analytical 
parts are superior to the formulations in the ear­
lier plans. An annual growth rate offive per cent in 
agricultural production is anticipated. In the previ­
ous plans almost half the increase in agricultural 
production came from an extension in area; now 
the increase is almost wholly expected from improv­
ed productivity. The qualitative change in the ef­
fort needed can be easily recognized.
The main input, we are told, will be the new 
technology, the key areas of activity being those
1. «Fourth Five-Year Plan, 1969-74-Draft a Summary»,
Reserve Bank of India Bulletin, 23-1017-40 (July 23, 1969), 
pp. 1018-19.
where high-yielding varieties can provide the need­
ed response. In rice, jowar and bajra such exten­
sion has to be three-fold to four-fold: from 9.2 mil­
lion hectares in 1968-69, of which wheat accounted 
for 4.8 million hectares or more than half the area, 
the HYV (high-yielding varieties) programme will 
be raised to 25 million hectares, of which wheat 
will only cover 7.7 hectares. «For obtaining opti­
mum results from the high-yielding varieties pro­
gramme, the main thrust of effort will be in the 
sphere of extension. The new varieties require more 
refined and precise cultural practices concerning 
preparation of seedbed and methods of sowing. 
Perhaps the most significant aspect relates to con­
trolled irrigations so that water is supplied at cri­
tical periods of plant growth». How many State 
Governments, in the climate of instability that is 
being fostered, are in a position to provide these 
extension services and to attend to the technologi­
cal change-over? Again, in the face of the spread­
ing Naxalite unrest in the rural areas, and the un­
certainties maintained there by the constant talk of 
land reforms without any final transformation, how 
many agriculturists will be willing to make the in­
vestments and undergo the discipline that a techno­
logical changeover demands? A five per cent annu­
al rate of growth in agricultural production is, of 
course, desperately needed and indications are that 
this target will be met. Table 5 shows the specific 
agricultural target contemplated by crops in the 
fourth plan.
In keeping with the campaign promise (1971) of 
the ruling party to reduce unemployment drastically, 
programs have been initiated to provide as many 
jobs as possible through the emphasis on labor in­
tensive employment generating industries. But a 
word of caution is in order, in achieving any signif­
icant progress in reducing unemployment particu­
larly in the light of past experience in the three five 
year plans.
Though the fourth plan is in its third year, its 
achievements are rather obscure at best, and by 
far fall short of the fourth plan target. For example, 
national income rose five per cent in 1969-70 com­
pared to the base of the previous year but per cap­
ita income rose only 2.5 per cent. Industrial pro­
duction increased by 5 per cent in 1969-70 and 4.5 
per cent in 1970-71 due to shortages of certain raw 
materials especially steel and raw cotton.2 How­
ever, agriculture on the other hand is making, if not 
remarkable, steady progress. As a matter of fact 
for the first time India is contemplating export of 
wheat and wheat products to Middle East during
2. Information Service, Embassy of India, India News, 
Vol. IX, No. 47 (Washington, D.C.: 1971), p. 2.
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TABLE 5. Fourth Plan Targets of Agricultural Production*
Sr No. Commodity Unit
Base Level 
Production 
(1968-69)
Estimated
Production
(1973-74)
1 Foodgrains Million tonnes 98 129
2 Oilseeds Do 8.5 10.5
3 Sugarcane (Gur) Do 12 15
4 Cotton Million bales 6 8
5 Jute Do 6.2 7.4
6 Tobacco Million kgs. 380 480
7 Coconut Million nuts 5,600 6,600
8 Cashewnut Do 160 236
9 Arecanut Thousand tonnes 126 150
10 Pepper Do 23 42
11 Lac Do 35 52
12 Tea Do 418 450
♦Source: Reserve Bank India Bulletin, 23: 1017-40 (July, 1969).
next year.1 However, in assessing the overall pro­
gress of the fourth plan one has to take note of 
the proceedings of the newly constituted Planning 
Commission on October 6, 1971:
The appraisal of the progress made so far is still not complete, 
but tentative findings are that the Centre has done badly. 
Shortfalls in expenditure in each of the first two years have 
been of the order of Rs 200 crores (though the States have 
overshot their expenditure, making the overall shortfall in 
the Plan outlay in the first two years just slightly over Rs 
200 crores).
The Planning Commission has come to the conclusion that 
poor performance has led to serious distortions and imba­
lances in the economy. Shortfalls have been mainly on the 
industrial front and investments have fallen well below targets 
in such crucial fields as heavy industry, mining, etc.
But it was acknowledged today that, taking into account the 
rise in prices in the last two years, achievement in real terms 
has been around 15 % less than the targets aimed at. This has 
been mainly in industry, but certain sectors of agriculture 
have also not done well.
The position regarding cereals was reported to be sound 
—the target of a 5.5 % annual rise in production is being 
maintained—but production of pulses, cotton, oilseeds and 
sugar has lagged behind and caused further distortions in 
the economy.
Since the satisfactory position on the cereals front is attrib­
uted to a technological breakthrough, it was decided today 
that expenditure on research into production problems of 
other crops should be stepped up.
A far bleaker picture has emerged on the industrial front... 
Various factors, such as shortages of raw materials, non­
utilization of capacity and bad labor relations have been identi­
fied, for the shortfall.2
In addition to this assessment, we should also take 
into consideration the effect of the 17 day war with
1. New York Times, May 7, 1972.
2. The Statesman Weekly (Calcutta : Saturday, October 9,
1971), p. 7.
Pakistan, with an influx of 10 million refugees (though 
most of them have returned to Bangladesh) in the 
overall performance of the fourth plan.
Some Observations
The foregoing general observations are made not 
with a view of criticizing the basic strategy of the 
plan, which is perhaps the one the country should 
have adopted under the circumstances, but with a 
view of seeing whether the implications flowing 
from the strategy have received full and conscious 
acceptance and attention.
Consider, for instance, the incremental capital 
output ratio. The performance of the second plan 
shows a capital output ratio of 2.8:1. Advance cal­
culations of investment output relation in a growing 
economy is a difficult exercise but world experience 
would suggest that the ratio becomes higher as 
the economy progresses on the path of industriali­
zation.3 One would, in the normal course, have ex­
pected the Planning Commission to assume a slight­
ly higher ratio for the third plan, that is, unless 
the pattern of investment adopted in the plan were 
to suggest a reversal of the trend of heavy indus­
trialization. As a matter of fact, however, the third 
plan appears to have been formulated on the as­
sumption of a capital output ratio of 2.4:1. In view 
of the bold advance towards industrialization con­
ceived by the third plan, and the accent it lays on 
basic industries the adoption of a capital output 
ratio lower than the one that prevailed in the sec-
3. Shariff, Ismail, The Development of Indian and American 
Agriculture : A Comparative Study. Interstate publishers and 
printers, Chicago, 1968, pp. 14-15.
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ond plan would seem to have been unrealistic. The 
adoption of a higher capital output ratio would 
have been in conformity with the basic strategy of 
the plan, and might have also led to more inten­
sive efforts at resource mobilization.
Second, the assumption in the third plan of a 
rise in the rate of saving to 11 per cent at the close 
of the plan is unattainable, unless we adopt to­
talitarian techniques of direct physical restraints on 
the masses of the people. Under full individual free­
dom over the disposal of one’s earnings as between 
spending and saving, we may not reasonably ex­
pect the rate of saving to rise above 6 per cent.
Third, in the formulation of a policy for ac­
celerating the national product, we must take note 
of the following factors more thoroughly than it 
has been given under the four successive plans. 
First, 50 per cent of the Indian national income 
comes from agriculture, and 70 per cent of the pop­
ulation draws its living from it. Manufacturing in­
dustries accounting for less than 20 per cent of eco­
nomic activity. Peasant farming dominated agricul­
ture on a crude traditionalistic basis. This in itself 
is manifest and suggests the need for a rapid de­
velopment of agricultural industry. For the basic 
necessity of life is food. Then comes clothing and 
housing. But food has the priority. The fact that India 
until recently was unable to produce enough food 
for its own people is a very sad commentary of the 
Indian economy. The first thing, therefore, that In­
dia should plan for is to produce more food for the 
growing millions. Accordingly, India has to devote 
a greater percentage of total plan investment, to 
be used for agricultural development. This will not 
only provide food (or at least more than what the 
people have today), but also at the same time with 
the development of agriculture, we will be plac­
ing the Indian economy on a more solid and depen­
dable basis. It will also pave the way for a sound 
development of other nonagricultural sectors at a 
more rapid rate. Nobody would deny the impor­
tance of industries in a modern world. However, 
we should have manufacturing industries and we 
should have plants for producing machinery. But 
all manufacturing industries require labor. In many 
industries half the cost of production consists of 
wages of labor. If industries are to prosper labor 
must be cheap and also efficient. But cheap and ef­
ficient labor can be had only if food is cheap and 
abundant. Make food available in plenty, and make 
it cheap and automatically this will lead to laying 
a sound foundation for the economy. Manufac­
turing industries have been complaining of a lack 
of balance between price and costs. The cost-price 
ratio has been adversely affected in recent years 
and the industries are not making the progress
they should be.1 The only way to bring about 
this proper balance is to make food cheaper. The 
Indian Government has in some cases fixed the 
wages of the laborers too high, in other cases have 
fixed the prices of raw materials like sugar cane 
and cotton too high. It seems that this was an 
attempt to provide the laborers and growers of 
cane and cotton with more income. But one can­
not increase the supply of food by putting more mo­
ney in the pockets of consumers. Rather one has 
to put more money in enterprises which produce 
more food.
The Fourth Plan is based upon various assump­
tions, such as price stability and 7 percent a year 
increase in exports. In the first year of the Plan, 
the price level has risen by 6 percent, manufactur­
ing industries have registered a growth in output 
of only 6.3 percent instead of the expected 9 per­
cent and exports have increased by only 3.8 per­
cent. If the Plan targets are to be reached, the ef­
fort needed in the remaining two years will have 
to be greater than envisaged in the Plan; for in­
stance, exports will have to rise by 8 percent a year. 
Though the Plan covers the years 1969-1974, the 
document was finalized only in the middle of 1970. 
Unfortunately, it has neither been revised in the 
light of the first year’s experience nor have been 
provided indications of corrective action.Furthermore, 
no indications are available from the Government. 
At the first meeting of the AICC of the Ruling Con­
gress after the finalization of the Plan, there was 
no discussion on the Plan and, therefore, no light 
has been thrown on how the Government proposes 
to buttress the crumbling assumptions of the Plan.2
The Plan envisages a marked increase in domes­
tic savings. The total domestic savings are to go 
up from 8.8 percent to 13.2 percent of the National 
Income at the end of the Plan period. Household 
savings will register a small increase, from 6.4 per­
cent of the National Income to 7.6 percent; corpo­
rate savings are expected to remain relatively con­
stant—from 1 percent to 1.1 percent. Public savings 
will jump from 1.4 percent to 4.5 percent of the 
N.I. The success of the Plan thus depends upon 
the Government’s capacity to mobilize adequate sav­
ings and channel them to desired areas of invest­
ment. The trend is expected to continue up to 1980- 
81, when public saving will have to rise to 8.2 per­
cent while the two other streams of savings will 
have only minor increases—of 0.8 percent and 0.3 
percent respectively. The order of effort, in absolute 
terms, is indicated thus; given the objective of
1. «Trends in Industrial Production, 1962», Indian Stati­
stical Series, No. 9.
2. The Statesman Weekly (Calcutta, Saturday, July 6, 
1970), p. 2.
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dispensing with net aid after 1980-81 the volume 
of domestic savings will have to rise from Rs 2,530 
crores in 1968-69 to approximately Rs 10,450 
crores by 1980-81—or a four-fo'd increase in 
twelve years.1
The Plan assumes the generation of an additional 
income of about Rs 1,800 crores a year of which 
about Rs 700 crores will be invested.
The draft Fourth Plan had expected the balance 
from current revenue to be Rs 2,400 crores. The 
final document has brought it down to Rs 1,625 
crores. In the Third Plan the expectation was Rs 
460 crores but the actuals turned out to be minus 
Rs 642 crores. For the succeeding three annual 
plans, the total expectations were Rs 621 crores 
the actuals proved to be Rs 184 crores. During 
the first two years of the Fourth Plan, the balance 
from current revenue at the Centre (the combined 
picture of the State remains dismal) has been Rs 
117 crores and Rs 180 crores respectively. If the 
remaining Rs 1,327 crores are to be realized, the an­
nual accomplishment in the subsequent two years 
must be about Rs 450 crores a year. Nobody knows 
what positive steps are being taken, or are under 
active consideration, for this leap forward.2
In the past, the Centre managed to raise its share 
of additional taxes and it is well poised to achieve 
the Fourth Plan target. The States, however, have 
recently become even more remiss. In the first year, 
they were expected to raise Rs 122 crores through 
additional taxes; they raised only Rs 37.4 crores 
inclusive of Rs 8.8 crores from lotteries. It is pos­
sible that a full year’s impact may be somewhat 
larger, but it cannot possibly be the Rs 84 crores 
needed to meet the expected target.
Above all the planning mechanism India has 
suffered from lack of implementation from its ve­
1. Ibid., p. 4.
2. Ibid., p. 4.
ry inception. Mainly because of the fact that the 
planning commission’s role is subjected to political 
dependency as it lacks any autonomy in its think­
ing. In any democratic government, planning in the 
last analysis must be a political process, and the 
Indians never have fallen into any delusion to the 
contrary. Yet this basic circumstance condemns 
the Planning Commission as a central staff agency 
charged with performing a quasi-expert, and also 
quasi-political function to an inherently precarious 
ambivalent set of relationship with the Central Gov­
ernment’s ministries and other major line of or­
ganization, as well as India’s eighteen State govern­
ments. The precariousness of the Commissions po­
sition is intensified by the fact that being deprived 
of political independence, the Commission’s polit­
ical bargaining power depends almost wholly on 
the liveliness of the support it draws from the 
Prime Minister.3
As a consequence of this, the very texture of the 
Planning Commission’s operations lacks flexibility 
in its basic thinking and hence in implementation 
of its objectives. A plan is of little value, no matter 
how good it looks on paper, if its execution is faul­
ty. This would create even more problems for a 
developing economy. Rightly a success or failure of a 
planning effort does not depend on the flawless blue 
print but on its execution. Countries like India look 
to planning as a way to achieve more rapid growth 
rate than is expected from a relatively free economy. 
But such planning to be effective, requires an inde­
pendent judgment based on facts without any out­
side influence, political or otherwise.
Despite such shortcomings and difficulties it is 
encouraging to note that India is desperately try­
ing to change the economic spectrum of the count­
ry through a planned endeavour.
3. Lewis, John P., Quit Crisis in India, The Bookings 
Institution, 1962, pp. 114-136.
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ERRATA
In the article «The Modern Greek Collection in the Library of Congress», by George E. Perry, published in our Review,
No. 15-16, January-June 1973, have been noted few mistakes which are being corrected as follows:
page 17, line 26, column 1, instead of : it should be noted that editions of ancient Greek authors considered... 
read : Greek authors are considered...
page 19, line 26, column 2, instead of : Γεωργίου Μπεντότε 
read: Βεντότη
page 19, line 26, column 2, instead of : (Vienna 1972) 
read : 1792
page 19, line 28, column 2, instead of : Στοιχεΐον μαθηματικόν 
read : Στοιχείων μαθηματικών.
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